Coalitions in West European Democracies by Schofield, Norman
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
COALITIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 
Norman Schofield 
,�-:,1\lUTE Ot: 
�'ti-
'"�c 
� � § � < 0 
l,..J 
Cl 
. -< -I • � /;j � � l-r. ,....;;;, It '" SJiALL �p..\1-.� 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 483 
July 1983 
COALITIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES* 
Norman Schofield 
ABSTRACT 
The duration and type of coalition governments in twelve european 
countries in the period 1945-1983 are considered. It is argued that 
the distribution of party size, on a one dimensional policy dimension, 
conditions the bargaining process between parties and thus the type of 
coalition that forms and the average duration of government. On this 
basis the twelve countries are divided into four groups. 
* Presented at the Research Meeting on the Future of Party Government, 
European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, June 1982 and the 
International Political Studies Association XII World Congress, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, August 1982. 
This material is based upon work supported by a Nuffield Grant on 
Political Stability. 
Thanks are due to Eric Browne, Ian Budge, Larry Dodd, Manfred Holler, 
Martin Paldam, Bill Riker, Ken Shepsle either for comments or for 
making available unpublished work, and to Sean Bowler for his research 
assistance . 
Introduction; 
COALITIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 
Norman Schofield 
Theories of Coalition Formation and Stability 
In the period September 1981 to April 1983, elections have been held in ten 
of the old established parliamentary democracies of Europe.1 In at least seven 
of these countries the election lead to the break up of a left or centre-left 
coalition and the formation of a right or centre-right government. Only 
in Sweden did a left wing party, the Social Dem:>crat Labour Party, gain 
enough seats to form a government. In that case the previous centre-right 
three party government coalition lost twelve seats to the labour party. 
In a number of other countries, the electoral move to the right removed 
a' socialist or social dem::>cratic party that had been in government for 
many years. In Austria the Socialist Peoples Party (SPO) had been in office 
for thirteen years but lost five seats, and its majority in April 1983, to 
the two parties of the centre-right. In Germany In October 198 2 ,  the 
centre-left coalition (that had lasted thirteen years) of Social 
Democrats and Free Democrats was destroyed by the defection of the Free 
Democrats. In the election of March 1983, the two Christian parties on 
the right gained eighteen seats, although the free democrats lost seats 
effectively to the new Green Party. In Norway in September 1981 the 
Conservatives gained thirteen seats from the Christian Party and Labour 
Party. 
The remaining four countries (Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and 
Ireland) were characterised not only by this move to the right, but by 
a remarkable recent increase in electoral volatility and coalition 
instability. 
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In the Netherlands the Liberals (VVD) gained ten seats, in September 
1982, essentially at the expense of a small centre party, and formed a 
government coalition with the larger centre Christian Democratic Party (CDA). 
In the previous intra - election period, however, a coalition of the Christian 
Dem::>cratic Party and Labour Party (PvdA) had formed in September 1981, broken 
up in October, reformed, and then resigned in May 1982. This coalition 
instability contrasted remarkably with the history of long lived governments 
between 1972 and 1981. 
Similarly in Belgium the Liberals {PVV) increased their seats from 3n to 
5 2  in the November 1981 election. This lead to the break up of the previous 
coalition of Socialist party and Christian Social Party (CVP} and the formation 
of a CVP-PVV coalition. Again between the election of 1977 and that of 1981, five 
different coalition governments had been in existence (an average life of 
ten months each). 
Electoral volatility is even more apparent in Denmark. In the election 
of December 1981 the large Social Democrat Party lost seats to both the 
Socialists on the left and the Democratic Centre Party on the right, while the 
smaller Progress Party lost seats to the larger conservatives. The social 
democrats formed a minority government for nine months and then resigned in 
favour of a minority four party coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, Democratic 
Centre Party and Christian Peoples Party. This coalition depends for support on 
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the small Radical and Progress Parties. The average lifetime of the five 
minority social democratic govermnents that had been in office since 1975 is 
about eighteen months. 
In Ireland there have been elections in June 1981 and February and 
December 1982. After the first, Fine Gael formed a majority =alition with 
the labour party. Then Finna Fail formed a minority government, and once again 
Fine Gael is in office. It is probable hi:>wever that this government will 
be no longer lived than the previous one. At the election of April 1983 in 
Iceland, the two centre left parties, of the previous three party coalition, 
lost 4 seats between them to the other coalition partner, the Independence 
Party on the right. A new feminist party gained three seats while the centre 
Social Democratic Party broke into two factions. 
In Italy there have been three elections since 1972, but at least eleven 
governments, all involving the large Christian Democrat Party. An attem?t to 
maintain a centre left coalition under Spaddini, of the Republican Party, 
was aborted in December 1982. The same coalition under Fanfani , of the 
Christian Democrats , recently collapsed , but reformed under Craxi , of the 
Socialist party , after the June 1983 election. 
To fully understand these phenomena requires a model which incozporates 
i) . a theory of voting response to party behaviour, ii) a theory of the 
transformation of votes into parliamentary seats via the electoral system 
iii) a theory of the formation and survival of government once parliamentary 
strength is determined. This paper addresses itself to the third aspect. 
One of the principal difficulties with building a theory of government 
coalition behaviour is that various authors have adopted quite different 
conceptual frameworks within which to model coalition behaviour. For example 
one may assume that political parties attempt to maximise power or rewards. 
Such an assumption might lead one to the theory of games, particularly 
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of games with sidepayments. From such a perspective, it is possible to argue 
that minimal winning (i.e. just winning) coalitions should form (Riker,1962). 
However it is well known that, in such a context, any coalition is unstable 
(Schofield,1978) • Under some circumstances it is plausible in this 
context to make use of bargaining theory in an attempt to pick out 
coalitions which are "quasi-stable" (Schofield, 1982). 
A second possibility is to assume that parties have policy preferences 
which can be represented in a policy space of one or more dimensions. 
At least in one dimension, theory predicts that the party at the median 
position (in terms of party strengths) should belong to each government 
coalition. Various authors have devised more restrictive hypotheses on 
coalition formation that have none the less been based on a notion 
of coalition bargaining over policy (Axelrod 1970, de Swaan 1973,etc.} 
It is quite clear that policy or ideological dimension does play a role 
in coalition formation. However the general position that will be adopted 
in this paper is that the relatively simple coalition theories that have been 
considered tend to be unsuited to the wide variety of structures that are 
apparent in the European parliamentary democracies. More specifically 
the perspective adopted here is that it is the pattern of strength and 
position of each party in each parliamentary situation that determines 
the bargaining possibilities inherent in the situation. However as 
game theory informs us, it is not possible to infer directly from 
such a pattern which coalition will come into being. 
A second point is that. sm all ·changes in electoral support, and 
thus party strength, can result in quite significant changes in the 
qualitative features of the parliamentary situation, and thus in the 
behaviour that is exhibited. For this reason no attempt is made to 
statistically analyse the data on coalition formation and stability. 
However an attempt is made to cluster the twelve countries under 
consideration into groups that exhibit some similarities in the quali-
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tative properties of their parliamentary structures. Even such a classification 
is excessive to some extent, since ,as the description of recent events 
indicates, electoral volatility in a number of these countries has 
resulted in qualitative change,of the kind mentioned above, in the 
parliamentary situation. 
One of the features of the parliamentary situation that is of 
significance is the degree to which parliamentary strength is fragmented. 
As the discussion of the previous section indicated, in a number of the 
European countries (particularly Belgium, Denmark, Italy and more 
recently Ireland and the Netherlands) governments have tended to be 
relatively short lived. This phenomenon is consistent with the conclusions 
of a literature of the 1950's and 1960's which argued that multiparty 
systems (with more than two significant parties) tend to be associated 
with less stable governments (Duverger, 1951). As Blondel (.1968) has said 
"it does seem that one party government . • • •  
is the factor contributing most decisively 
to the stability of governments". 
Such a conclusion is all very well, but one might well argue, for 
normative reasons, that multiparty systems and coalition governments 
are more receptive to electoral preference than the essentially two party 
systems in Britain and elsewhere (Schofield,1981). Moreover, as 
we have indicated, the parliamentary democracies of Europe exhibit a wide 
range of types of multiparty systems and government stabilities. 
A first step in exploring the Duverger hypothesis however is to 
relate the degree of parliamentary fractionalism with government duration. 
To define fractionalism, let C,p1, . • •  ,pn) be the proportions of the 
seats controlled by the various parties in the parliament. Define 
H 
n 
I p� 
l=l l. 
to be the Herfindahl index of concentration. This has possible maximum 
and minimum values of 1 and o. Conversely F = 1 - H is the index of 
fractionalism discussed in Rae (1967) and Rae and Taylor (1970) • An 
alternative measure of fragmentation is the reciprocal of the Herfindahl 
index (H
-l) called the effective n1JI!lber of parties (Laasko and Taagepera, 
1979). Although other measures of concentration can be devised (see 
Schofield, 1981) in this paper we shall use only H and H-1. 
Taylor and Herman (1971) found the correlation coefficient between 
fractionalism and duration to be -0.407, while the coefficient between 
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the number of parties and duration was -.418. In an examination of Blondel' s 
thesis, Herman and Sanders (1977) found a correlation of 0.299 between 
duration and the majority status of the coalition. Although there is clearly 
a relationship between fractionalism and duration, the relatively low 
proportion of variance explained (about 20%) indicates that the relationship 
is quite subtle. 
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A general picture of this relationship is perhaps smnmed up in the obser­
vation that the average effective number of parties, in the twelve West 
European countries examined here, has increased from 3. 4 ,  in the period 
up to 1971, to 3.9 in the ten years since, while average government duration 
has dropped from 27 months to 23 months. To give examples from individual 
countries, in Belgium the average effective number has increased from 2.9 
to 5.8 and duration dropped from 28 months to 12 (See Table 1) . 
A second research programme in the 1970's involved the analysis of the 
type of coalitions that occurred in multiparty systems. Perhaps the most 
celebrated coalition predictor is the minimal winning (MW) principle due to 
Riker (1962) . He argued on the basis of a formal gane theory analysis that 
only coalitions which are winning, but may lose no members and remain winning, 
will form. However, Herman and Pope (l973) analyzed 207 coalition events and 
found that only 73 (i. e. 35%) were minimal winning. Of the rest 60 (29%) 
were surplus (i.e. winning but not minimal winning) while 74 (or 36%) were 
minority cases (i. e. not even winning) . 
A number of other coalition predictors were based on the existence of a 
one dimension policy space in which parties were located. The general 
idea behind these "diversity" predictors was that the more ideologically 
diverse a coalition the il.ess stable would it be, or the less likely would it 
be to come into existence. 
Leiserson (1966,1968) defined the diversity of a coalition to be 
the sum of the number of "spaces" between the parties in the coalition 
together with the number of "holes" resulting from missing parties within 
the coalition. His diversity predictors (DW) was that the least diverse 
coalitions should form. Axelrod (1970) proposed that minimal connected 
winning coalitions (MCW) should form. A coalition is MCW if it is both 
7 
i) winning and ii) connected in the sense that all coalition members are 
adjacent on the policy scale iii) unable to lose a member and remain both 
winning and connected. Finally de Swaan (1970,1973) proposed a policy distance 
theory (PW) based on the concept of bargaining over outcomes between members 
of potential coalitions. 
In a statistical analysis of the MW, DW and MCW predictors, Taylor and 
Laver (1973) found that the MCW predictor performed best overall, but partic­
ularly well in the case of I taly. For Belgi1lill, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands the MW predictor was satisfactory. Using a somewhat different statistical 
method , an analysis by Mokken and de Swaan (1980) indicated that the policy 
distance predictor did not in fact work very effectively. These statistical 
analyses, of course , depend rather significantly on the type of statistical 
comparison used and on the definition of a "coalition" event. In any 
particular parliamentary situation, the set of possible minimal winning 
coalitions is larger than the set of, say, minimal connected winning coalitions. 
Consequently a success by the more parsimonious theory must be more heavily 
weighed. As regards the definition of a coalition event, it is common to 
define a government as an 
"administration which meets any of the following criteria 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
formation after a general election; 
change in Prime Minister 
change in the party composition of the cabinet 
resignation in an interelection period followed by the 
reformation of the government with the same Prime Minister and 
party compo si ti on" • (Hunri tz,1971) • 
Here a party is regarded as a member of the government 
"when one or more individuals identified with the party participate 
in the cabinet". (de Swaan, 1970) . 
This definition means, of course, that a party which provides even formal 
"support" to the governing coalition is not in the coalition if it has no. 
members in cabinet. In this paper only categories (a) and (c) are regarded 
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as constituting a coalition change, since both category (b) and (d) imply that 
the same coalition is in power. 
Since the MW and MCW are the two most significant coalition predictors, 
this paper essentially contrasts these two theories by considering the types 
of government coalitions listed in Table 2. 
Single party majority party governments are included in Group l, 
since it is of interest to compare the duration of this type of government 
with that of coalition governments. 
Groups 2 to 5 consist of surplus coalitions, or coalitions which are 
winning but not minimal winning: in Group 5 are the MCW but non MW coalitions; 
in Group 4 the connected but not MCW coalitions; and Group 3 are the 
unconnected surplus coalitions. 
Minimal winning coalitions are located in Groups 6 and 7, depending on 
whether or not they are MCW. Clearly Groups 5 and 6 make up the set of MCW 
coalitions. 
Finally Groups 8 and 9 are the minority coalitions, which do not have a 
formal majority. Those minority coalitions in Group,8 actually have tacit 
9 
support from parties outside the coalition sufficient to make up a parliamentary 
majority. Table 3 of the Appendix presents the frequency of the different 
coalition types by country in the period up to a convenient election in 
the early l970's 
Since the period covered by Table 3 corresponds approximately 
to the period examined by Taylor and Laver, we can use it to interpret their 
findings. Of the 136 coalition governments in this period, only 40 (or 30%) 
were minority. If supported coalitions are regarded as winning, then there 
were only 17 (or 13%) . On the other hand there were 51 (or 38%) minimal 
winning coalitions, 35 (or 26%) surplus coalitions, and 42 (or 31%) MCW 
coalitions. From the individual country data, it is obvious that essentially 
only in Italy do coalitions which are Mew but not MW form. In other 
countries such as Belgium, Iceland and Luxembourg essentially the only 
coalitions which form are MW. 
Table 7 reports the same data for the l970's. More or less as 
in the previous period, there are 19 (or 32%) minimal winning coalitions out 
of 62 and 14 (or 23%) MCW. One change however is that there are 18 (or 30%) 
unsupported minority single party or coalition governments. 
In the post war period until the present, the class of minimal winning 
coalitions is the most numerous of our categories. Although the MCW predictor 
is a more parsimonious theory, in the sense of giving a smaller predictor 
set in general, in another sense it is a less parsimonious theory in that 
assumptions about the nature of the policy making process are implicit within 
the theory. The basis for the minimal winning theory on the other hand is that 
political actors seek rewards from office, and these are essentially private 
goods, namely cabinet posts or their equivalents. 
2. The Duration of Coalitions 
Rather than comparing these coalition events alone, it is useful to 
analyse the duration of the different kinds of coalition governments. 
Warwick (1979) has summed up the results of this third research programme 
(see Table 3). It is possible to relate these results to table 4 of 
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the Appcndi:ii;. where average duration in each of the nine coalition groups is 
presented. As noted above, there is a correlation of .299 between the majority 
status of the coalition and duration. From Table 4 of t!1e Appendix, 
the average duration of minority (non majority coalitions) is 19 months, 
compared with 30 months for the majoritarian cases (when we exclude those 
cases with single majority parties). 
Warwick reports correlation coefficients of 0.643 and 0.560 respectively 
between MW or MCW status and duration. Again from Table 4 of the Zlp:::iendix 
it can be seen that the average duration of MW coalitions up to 1971 
was 35 months, while for MCW coalitions it was 33 months. However for 
MCW coalitions which were not MW, the average duration was only 20 months. 
As Warwick says, the regression 
"Produces no significant role for MCW in accounting for durability 
once MW is entered in the equation. On the evidence, there is no room 
for the ideological criterion posited by Axelrod". 
Laver (1974) had previously compared the stability of MW and MCW 
coalitions with that of the least diverse (DW) coalitions. He defined 
stability to be the ratio of the average coalition duration to the maximum 
possible duration as defined by country specific rules on elections. He 
found that DW had a statistically significant mean stability of 0.5 2 
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=ompared with 0.53 for MW and 0.48 for MCW. 
Warwick pursued Laver's notion further and obtained a correlation coefficient 
of -. 352 between diversity and duration. However, as Table 3 shows when 
duration is regressed on diversity, minimal winning status and number of 
parties, the diversity variable becomes insignificant. These results 
indicate that the minimal winning criterion is the most effective explicator 
for coalition durability, and add force to Taylor and Herman's contention 
that 
"ideology does not play a very important role in (explaining) 
goverment stability". 
However these analyses do not provide a reason why minimal winning 
coalitions tend to be more stable than other forms of coalitions, or 
why minimal winning coalitions tend to form in some countries and not in 
others. 
In an ambitious piece of work Dodd (1974, 1976) has attempted to explain 
both coalitional status (i.e. minimal winning or minority) and durability in 
terms of structural features of the parliamentary system. His most important 
explanatory variable is conflict cleavage. On a particular ideological continuum 
he estimates the position x. of each party i. Let x be the mean position 
i 
and let 
Conflict Cleavage � - 2 lPi (xi - x) 
where pi is the proportion of seats controlled by party i. 
Tables 4 to 8 present representative examples of party strength and 
estimates of party position on the economic policy dimension. In a situation 
such as the Austrian party structure in 1953 with two large centrally 
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located parties, conflict cleavage is only moderately high. In Ireland, on 
the contrary, with a dominant party (Finna Fail) the distribution of strength 
around this party is relatively low and thus conflict cleavage is low. In 
Finland on the other hand party strength is more uniformly distributed over 
the policy continuum and conflict cleavage is high. 
Dodd defines coalitional status in terms of the absolute value of the 
difference in size between the coalition and the simple majority. He 
obtains a negative correlation between status and durability, thus 
indicating that MW coalitions tend to be most long lived, and that as a 
coalition becomes larger or smaller than MW then its durability decreases. 
His explanation is in terms of two variables: uncertainty and the 
constraints on bargaining. Essentially Dodd views fragmentation and cabinet 
turnover as indicative of uncertainty in the political system, and argues 
that this will be associated with short lived governments. In a situation 
of high uncertainty and high conflict, or polarized fractionalism, then short 
lived minority coalitions will tend to form. On the other hand, with high 
uncertainty and low conflict, or depolarized fractionalism, then short lived 
surplus coalitions will form. 
While Dodd's theory is extremely interesting there are a number of 
difficulties which become obvious when individual countries are examined. 
If we contrast the Netherlands and Italy in the period up to 1971 (see 
Tables 8 and 7) we see that the Netherlands has a concentration index of .22 
and conflict cleavage of 7.38 while Italy has . 28 and 7.62 respectively. 
(I am grateful to Larry Dodd for supplying me with his estimates of the 
party positions on the economic policy dimension to enable me to compute 
conflict cleavage) . Since conflict cleavage is high in both countries, and 
the fragmentation is higher in the Netherlands, Dodd's model would suggest 
that the coalition government in Italy would be longer lived than the 
corresponding one in the Netherlands. In fact in Italy the Christian 
Democrats formed a minority government which lasted eight rronths until 
13 
February 1954, after which they formed a centre minimal winning coalition which 
persisted until mid 1957. In the Netherlands, Labour and the Catholic 
Peoples Party formed a minimal winning coalition which persisted over two 
years to the next election in 1948. More importantly minority coalitions almost 
never occurred in the Netherlands, while they occur regularly in Italy. Of 
course one of the components of uncertainty in Dodd's model is cabinet turnover, 
and this is much higher in Italy than in the Netherlands. However a model 
that explains current coalition instability in terms of past cabinet instability 
is not entirely adequate. 
A second difficulty with Dodd's IOC>del is made apparent by considering 
Finland and Italy. In both countries conflict cleavage and fragmentation 
are quite high, and on the basis of the IOC>del one would expect short lived 
minority governments. Although these have occurred, they have alternated 
with short lived surplus coalitions (see '.L'ables l.•and 5 of t.'le A9pendix) . 
Notwithstanding these comments, Dodd's analysis is important because it 
indicates that the character and durability of coalition government is 
determined by the distribution of party strengths along the principle 
dimension of socio-economic policy. The next section of the paper will 
attempt to discuss in a qualitative way how this distr1bution affects the 
bargaining game between parties, and thus the coalitions that come into being. 
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3. Party System and Coalition Stability 
The comparative party systems research of the 1960's by Blondel, Sartori, 
Rokkan and others attempted to classify multiparty systems in terms of criteria 
of size and relationship between the parties, and clearly this research formed · 
the background to the research on coalition stability discussed in the previous 
sections. Blondel's (1968) discussion of two or two and half party systems 
and multiparty systems with and without a dominant party lead to the analysis 
of the relationship between fragmentation and durability, while Sartori's 
(1966) distinction between pluralism and hyperpluralism �as a sir.nificant 
"influence on Dodd's model. 
The analyses by Sartori and Rokkan (1970) also inform the three-fold 
classification of European parliamentary systems by Daalder (1971) into 
unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems. Here we shall follow Daalder in 
attempting to account for coalition formation and duration in terms of the 
kind of bargaining that can occur in these different systems. 
Group 1. Bipolar Systems (Two and a Half parties) in Austria and Germany . 
Both Austria and West Germany currently exhibit a level of political 
concentration of between 0.4 and 0. 45 and thus have an effective number of parties 
of 2. 2 and 2. 5 respectively (see Table 6 of the Appendix). 
Austria: Dreijmanis (1982) describes how the two main parties, the Soeial-
istische Partei Osterreichs (SPO) and Osterreichische Volkspartei (OVP) resulted 
from the post war merger of prewar Christian Social parties and Social 
Democrat parties. These two parties generally gain about 85% of the 
electoral vote and 90% of the parliamentary seats. In the four elections 
from 1945 to 1956 the Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs (KFO) gained about 
5% of the vote and 4 seats (or 2%). Since 1959 the KPO vote has declined 
steadily from 3% to 1% and it has no parliamentary representation. In 1949 
the right wing Verbard der Unabhangigen (VdU) obtained about 12% of the vote 
and 16 seats (10%). In 1955 the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) 
became the successor of the VdU. It currently has 11 seats in Parliament. 
After the one year KPO-SPO-OVP coalition of national unity between 
December 1945 and November 1946, minimal winning coalitions were the rule 
until 1966, when the OVP obtained a majority. Dreijmanis has attributed 
the minimal winning but large SPO-OVP (or Black-Rea) coalition to the fear 
by the SPO of a permanent Black-Blue coalition of OVP and FPO. 
After the election of March 1970,the SPO alm:::>st obtained a majority, 
but formed a minority government with the support of the FPO. On the 
assumption that the parties are located in the order SPO-OVP-FPO, this 
implicit coalition violates the MCW and diversity notions of Axelrod and 
Leiserson. However on the clerical-anticlerical dimension this coalition 
could be regarded as connected. 
With two large parties centrally located in the policy dimension, the 
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level of conflict cleavage is not very high, and fragmentation low. Consequently 
the durable minimal winning coalitions that formed are consistent with 
Dodd's theory. 
Germany: Since 1961 the situation in Germany has been similar to that 
of Austria in that two large parties the Social Democrats (SDP) and 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), with between 40 to 50% of the seats, face 
the Free Democrats (FDP) with about 10%. After the election of 1949 more than 
seven parties were represented in the Bundestag: these included the 
Communist Party (KPD) , the Centre Party (Z), the Bavarian Party (BP) , the 
German Party (DP) and the National Democratic Party (DKP) . From 1949 to 
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1953 the largest party, the CDU/CSU, formed a MW coalition with the FDP and 
right wing parties. In 1953 this coalition became surplus with the inclusion 
of the All German Block (GB) with 27 seats. Even after the 1957 election 
when the CDU/CSU had a majority of the seats, it formed a surplus coalition 
with the DP. 
In evaluating the coalitions since 1961 there is some difficulty in 
locating the Free Democrats in relation to the SDP and CDU. On the 
economic dimension the FDP are usually regarded as being to the right of 
the CDU, while in terms of foreign policy they belong between the SDP and 
CDU. Under the first assmnption the CDU-FDP coalition from 1961 to 1967 
is connected, while the SPD-FDP coalition from 1969 is disconnected. In 
preparing the tables of the Ap�endi3 I have assumed that the FDP lies in 
between the two largest parties, and viewed the SPD-CDU coalition ofi 1967-1969 
as disconnected. 
As table One (Appendix) makes clear, the MW predictor works very well 
for Germany. Even the surplus coalition of 1953-1957 can be accounted for, 
by the need to pass constitutional· ammendments in the Bundestag which required 
a two thirds majority (Norpoth, 1982). The surplus coalition of 1957-1961 
may also be regarded as a strategic device of the CDU to absorb the DP. 
Of some interest is the process of concentration that occurred up till 
1961 during which small parties like the BP, DP, GB and Z with approximately 
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5% each of the electoral vote were eliminated. We shall address some theoretical 
remarks on this at the end of the paper. 
Group II. Multipolar systems (with two and two half parties) . 
Initially the pattern of party strength in Belgium and Luxembourg was 
roughly the same, with two large parties in the centre of the ideological spectrum, 
flanked by small parties on the left and right. 
In Luxembourg, aside from a brief grand coalition after the war, every 
coalition until 1974 has been both minimal winning and minimal connected 
winning. These all involved the Christian Social Party forming a coalition 
with either the Socialists or the Liberals. A Socialist-Liberal coalition 
lasted five years from 1974 to 1979, and then gave way to a Christian Social­
Liberal coalition after the Christian Social Party increased its seats in the 
1979 election. Since the communist party has not been involved in any 
coalition (except for the post war one) the situation in Luxembourg closely 
resembles the German-Austrian examples. Although fragmentation and the formal 
measure of conflict cleavage is higher in Luxembourg than in Germany or Austria, 
this is not reflected in lower average coalition durability. 
In Belgium on the other hand there has been increasing political 
fragmentation and governmental instability. In 1946, as Table 5 shows, the 
In such a two and a half party system, coalition government is extremely stable . Socialists (Belgische Socialistische Partij,BSP) and Christian Peoples Party 
'.I'he only najor inter election· coalition collapses occurred in 1!]157 when the 
FDP-CDU coalitio:i broke.up, and in October 1932 when .the FDP left the 
SDP for the CDU. 
(Christelijke Volkspartij, CVP) were flanked by the Communists (KPB) on the 
left and the Liberals (PW) . A Communist-Socialist-Liberal unconnected 
coalition lasted for a year or so from February 1946 and then gave way to a 
minimal connected winning BSP-CVP coalition in 1947. From then until 1961 
all coalitions were minimal winning. 
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In 1961 the Voksunie (VU) with 3 . 5% of the electoral vote and 5 seats 
(2.3%) took up position between the BSP and CVP. In 1965 this small party was 
followed into Parliamentary existence by the Democratic Front of the French 
Speaking in Brussels (FDF) and the Rassemblement Wallon (RWl with 2 and 3 
seats respectively and 1% of the electoral vote. Until 1974 these small centrally 
located federalist governments were not involved in government. However 
the RW joined with the CVP and PW in Tindermans second and third coalition 
governments of 1974 and 1976, and the VU and FDF in Tindermans fifth coalition 
government with the CVP and BSP in 1977. The importance of the ethnocultural 
problem, the development of small parties and even the split of major parties 
(like the BSP in 1978) have all contributed to increasing fragmentation and 
coalition instability. Clearly one dimensional coalition models such as those 
by de Swaan and Axelrod are inadequate in accounting for the pattern of 
formation and duration in Belgium. In a situation where a number of 
dimensions (economic, clerical and language) are salient, not only are small 
parties likely to come into existence, but coalition bargaining is likely 
to be extremely unstable (Schofield, 1978) . In such a situation the extreme 
government instability in Belgium is hardly surprising. 
Unlike Belgium and Luxembourg, where the largest party is a centre 
Christian Social Party, in Iceland the right wing Independence Party generally 
gains about 40% of the seats, while the Communists (PA) , Social Democratic 
Party (SOP) and Progressive Party (PP) usually obtain about 15%, 15% and 30% 
respectively of the seats. 
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Whereas in Luxembourg almost every coalition is a MW and MCW coalition 
containing the large Christian Social Party, the nature of coalition formation 
in Iceland is determined by the isolation of the large Independence Party 
on the right. From 1946 to 1949 a surplus but connected coalition of SOP, PP 
and IP governed. After the election of October 1949, the IP formed a caretaker 
minority government for fi�e months, and then joined in a MW and MCW coalition 
with the PP until 1956. The left wing PA-SOP-PP coalition lasted until 1959, 
and this gave way to an SOP-IP coalition that lasted until the election of 1971. 
On the economic cleavage this latter coalition is clearly unconnected. 
Grimsson (1982) has suggested that attitudes towards the US base at Keflavik 
became increasingly important, and that this made the natural IP-PP coalition 
difficult. 
In 1970 the Union of Liberals and Leftists (ULL) formed as a result of 
a split in the PA, and it was able to pick up nearly 9% of the electoral vote 
and 5 (or 8%) of the seats. This led to a left wing PA-ULL-SDP coalition 
which lasted until 1974. In 1974 the ULL only gained 4.6% of the electoral 
vote and 2 seats (3%) and finally in 1978 its 3 . 5% of the vote resulted 
in no seats. From 1974 to 1979 the MW and MCW coalitions, PP-IP and PA-SOP-PP 
occurred , while in 1980 a surplus unconnected coalition PA-PP-IP was formed. 
While it is apparent that a single policy dimension.,is unsufficient 
in explaining coalition formation in Iceland, Grimsson (1982) has argued that 
almost all the coalitions that have occurred have been connected in the two 
dimensional policy space (see Grofman,1982, for an analysis of coalition 
formation in such a context) . However the recent PA-PP-IP coalition is not 
connected even in two dimensions. This suggests that policy differences are 
not of overwhelming importance in Iceland . The considerable stability 
in party strength and electoral support in Iceland is clearly related to the 
durability of coalitions. 
. . 2 against small parties. 
�s in Germany, the electoral systen is biased 
Although the ULL survived for seven years, 
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once its electoral support dropped below 4% it lost its parliamentary existence. 
Group III. Unipolar Systems (One and four half parties) in Norway, SWeden, 
Denmark and Ireland. 
Surplus coalitions never occurred in the post war period in these countries, 
while minority coalitions were a fairly regular phenomena (see Tables 1 and 5 
of t�e Ap�endix) . According to Dodd's model, one would expect high fragmentation 
and high conflict cleavage in these parliamentary s:�rstems .  However each of these 
countries has a single dominant party which typically either obtains or nearly 
obtains a majority. As a consequence, fragmentation is approximately the same 
as in Iceland. The distribution of political strength is however quite 
different, and this is reflected in the relatively low values of the 
Conflict Cleavage measure. 
As Table 6 makes clear, the largest party in these countries is flanked 
by two small parties, and faces one or two medium sized parties on the right. 
One would therefore expect the largest party to form either minority or 
supported minority governments, and on occasion this minority government to 
be superceded by a right wing coalition. 
In Ireland for example, Finna Fail had an absolute majority of the seats 
from :1957 to 1961, from 1965 to 1973 and from 1977 to 1981, although it was 
only after the 1977 election that Finna Fail obtained a majority of the electoral 
vote. From 1951 to 1954, 1961 to 1965 and from February 1982 Finna· Fail 
actually formed a minority government, with suppor t on occasion from a farmer's 
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faction. Those coalitions that have occurred have been the result of the attempt 
by Fine Gael to exclude a Finna Fael and gain access to power. Thus, from 1948 
to 1951 and 1954 to 1957 Fine Gael formed a coalition with Labour and 
Clann na Tal.mhan. By 1965 the electoral support for Clann na Talmhan 
and Clann na Poblachla had dropped below 1% and they disappeared from 
Parliament. The Labour-Fine Gael coalition of 1973-1977 was unconnected on 
the economic policy scale. Cohan (1982) suggests however that aside from the 
motivation of Labour and Fine Gael to serve in government, the coalition was 
connected by virtue of the weak nationalism of the two parties. More 
generally, Cohan argues that conflict cleavage is low in Ireland because of 
the relative homogeneity of the society. Although Irish governments have been 
relatively long lived, it is evident that the cleavage between Finna Fael and 
the other two major parties may lead to a certain instability in the future. 
In particular electoral fluctuations have been quite pronounced. Although Finna 
Fail increased its electoral vote from 46% to 51% (and its seats from 69 to 
84) between 1973 and 1977, it lost its majority in 1981 gaining only 78 seats. 
In the two elections in 1982 neither Finna Fael nor Labour-Fine Gael 
obtained a clear majority. Indeed it would seem that the complexity of the 
policy space makes it possible for small groups or independent agents to gain 
representation and block the attainment of parliamentary majorities. 
In Norway the situation is somewhat similar. The largest party (Labour 
or DNA) has been in office from 1945 to 1965 and 1973 to 1981. Until 1961 
it had a majority of the seats, and when in 1961 it lost its majority it 
formed a supported minority government with the Socialist Peoples Party 
(SF) . When the SF withdrew its support in August 1963, a minority coalition of 
the four right wing parties formed and lasted a.bout three weeks, and was again 
replaced by the SF-DNA coalition. By 1965 the SF-DNA strength had dropped 
to 70 seats (47%), and the right wing MW and MCW coalition took office 
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for the next seven years. This collapsed to a centre right minority coalition 
of three parties for a year. From 1973 to 1981 Labour formed a minority 
government. However in September 1981 Labour only obtained 65 seats (43%) 
while the Conservatives increased their strength to 54 seats (36%) and 
formed a minority government. Clearly Norway has been moving away from 
a unipolar, majoritarian situation, to one where a large left wing Labour 
party faces a large Conservative party, and the two are separated by a number 
of small centre parties which seem to be losing support to the right. It is 
:;;>ossible that this :;>olarization will result in government instability. 
In Sweden the large Social Democratic Labour Party (SSA) faces a small 
Communist party and three medium sized right wing parties. Until 1976 the 
SSA was in the government, either in a minority capacity (1948-1951, 1957-1958, 
1973-1976), with the support of the Communist party (1958-1968,1970-1973) or 
in a MW and MCW coalition with the Agrarian party (1951-1957). 
Between 1968 and 1970 the Labour party actually had a majority. Fron 1976 
to Se?te::iber 1982 the t.'lree right wing parties �orr�ed a :majoritarian 
government coalition, but t�e La:Jour party is now the minority government. 
Until 1973, the Danish parliamentary system seemed to be a stable 
unipolar system like Norway. The Social Democrats (SD) were in office in a 
minority capacity (1971-1973) or with the support of the Radical Liberals 
(1947-1950, 1960-1964) or Justice Party (1953-1960, 1964-1968). The Liberal 
Agrarians (Venstre) and Conservatives (DKF) formed a minority coalition 
with the Radical Liberals in 1968-1971. As Table 4 of tae A?pendix 
shows, the average duration was about 2� years. 
Between 1971 and 1973 however the effective number of parties jumped 
from 4. 0 to 7. 0 when four new parties appeared. One faction, the Communist 
Party (DKP), split away from the Socialist Peoples Party and obtained 7.8% 
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of the electoral vote and fourteen seats; the Christian Peoples Party (KrF) 
took 4.0% of the vote and seven seats; and finally the Progress Party obtained 
twenty eight seats and 16% of the vote. 
The move away from the established parties was perhaps presaged by the 
drop in electoral support for the SD from 42% in 1964 to 34% in 1968. Paldam 
and Schneider (1980) in an analysis of relationship between government 
popularity and macro-economic variables, have indicated that increases of 
unemployment and the tax burden were correlated with the drop in the electoral 
popularity of the Social Democrats in the period 1958-1968. 
In examing the periods 1971 to 1973 and 1975 to 1978 when the SD 
formed a minority government , Paldam and Scheneider (1980) found an interesting 
pattern. They argue that the voters tended to regard the Social Democrats 
as the only party capable of dealing with unemployment. Thus while the SD 
were in office, increases of unemployment did not reduce the SD electoral 
popularity, but rather enhanced it, but did reduce the electoral popularity 
of the right wing parties. Increases in inflation did hurt the SD. Of 
greatest interest perhaps was the observation that increases of taxes while 
hurting the SD, greatly benefitted the Progress Party, a party which entered 
pariliament in 1973 on an anti tax platform. 
It is perhaps clear that in Denmark, voters see the policy space to be 
high dimensional. Small parties may readily come into existence; for example 
the Christian People Union obtained 2.6% of the electoral vote and five seats 
in 1979 . This has created a degree of electoral vol·atility and increasing 
political fragmentation. Whereas in 1957 the SD obtained 70 seats (42%) 
and the three right wing parties 89 seats (54%) , the party strengths had 
dropped by 1981 to 59 seats (33%) and 55 (31%) respectively. Thus the 
system has moved away from the earlier unipolar pattern to one characterized 
by greater fragmentation and m:>re complex political bargaining. The fact 
that the SD is flanked by small left wing or centre left parties (the left 
socialists, socialist peoples party, dem:>cratic centre) means that it can 
form a minority government with support. However policy differences between 
SD and its partners in the context of high political fragmentation is 
surely related to the relatively low average duration of government. 
Group IV: Fragmented Multipolar Systems (Netherlands, Finland, Italy) 
Although the dutch parliamentary system is similar to that of Finland 
in terms of fragmentation, and to Italy in terms of conflict cleavage, it 
is clear from Tables 9 and 12 of the :>:,ipendix that coalition types and 
duration are quite different in the Netherlands compared with Finland and 
Italy. 
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According to Dodd's model, Netherlands must be an example of depolarized 
hyperpluralism where political bargaining may proceed even in the highly 
fragmented system in a relatively amicable fashion. Lijphart (1976) has 
called this the "politics of accommodation". 
The largest party is the Catholic Peoples Party (KVP) which has been 
in every government since 1946. Indeed the KVP together with its two 
flanking "confessional" parties (de Swaan 1982) , the Anti Revolutuonary 
Party (ARP) and Christian Historical Union (CHU) have been at the heart of 
al.roost every coalition. In December 1976 these three parties allied them-
selves together with the Christian DeIOO>cratic Appeal (CDA) and in 1978 
formed a single party. As Table 8 shows these three parties had a majority 
of the seats and votes in 1946 . By 1972, electoral losses by all three 
parties had forced down their strength to 31%. De Swaan (1982) has argued 
that the pivotal party, the KPV, has tended to form surplus coalitions to 
balance the parties to its left and right. This is the essential idea 
behind de Swaans policy distance theory (PW) • 
For example in 1952 the ARP-KVP-CHU group has a majority (51 seats) 
but included the Labour Party (Pv1A) in the coalition. When the PvdA left 
the coalition in 1958, the remaining MW and MCW coalition only lasted three 
months. After the election of 1959 the "confessional" party strength 
rose to 75 seats (out of l.50); they formed a surplus coalition with the 
Liberals (VVD), which lasted until 1965. 
In 1972 the confessional coalition ( now 48 seats) brought in the 
Labour party (with 43 seats) but also the small democratic socialists. 
In 1977 the group switched to the right with the Liberals, hac:c to the 
left in 1981, and now after the last election, back to the right. 
Clearly the pivotal nature of the central CDA has until 1981 
endowed the political system with considerable stability (see Table 12 
of the �;::>;::>endix). However the system has evolved towards a three party 
structure(PvdA, CDA and VVD)together with the smaller but important 
democratic socialists. In this sense the Netherlands and Belgium have 
, 
become somewhat similar. The break up of the PvdA and CDA coalition in 
October 1981 and again in May 1982 indicates that coalition stability -
the politics of accommodation - may be a thing of the past. 
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In Italy a large Christian Democratic Party (DC) with about 40% of 
the electoral vote and seats faces a large communist party (PCI) with about 
30% of the vote and two medium sized socialist parties with 15%. Until 
1971, MCW centre coalitions involving the DC were common. Indeed such 
coalitions formed even when the DC had a majority between 1948 and 1953. 
In this period the party system may be regarded as almost unipolar. Just 
as in Group III minority government by the largest party was not uncommon. 
However Marradi (1982) sees the evolution as one from DC dominated "centrism" 
to that of a Socialist-Social Democrat- Christian Democrat coalition. These 
recent centre-left surplus connected coalitions have not been stable, and 
reflect the deep conflicts between factions in the socialist parties and the 
Christian Dem::>crats.3 
Finland is different again. The largest party is the Social Democrat 
Party, flanked by a large Popular Democrat Party and a Centre Party. On 
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the right is a larcge Conservative party. With high fragmentation and conflict 
cleavage, one expects from Dodd's m::>del short lived minority coalitions. 
While minority coalitions have occurred regularly, so have surplus coalitions. 
With four important parties, almost every possible coalition has formed 
at some time. As a result one would expect that the ideological coalition 
theories of Axelrod and Leiserson would not be relevant. However, neither 
does the "distributional" minimal winning theory of Riker provide an 
explanation for coalition formation in Finland. On the assumption 
that the political game in Finland is essentially one of bargaining over 
portfolios, I have argued elsewhere (Schofield 1982 ) that t�ere are 
theoretical reasons why sur�lus coali�ions I!lig�t alterna�e with minority 
party governments. 
Conclusion 
Every one of the pariamentary systems in the twelve countries 
that we have examined is unique in some way. The various theories that 
have been developed to explain coalition formation and duration in general 
work in one or two countries but not in others. For example linking 
fragmentation to political instability seems appropriate in Finland but 
not in the Netherlands, while the notion of connected coalitions works well 
in Netherlands but not in Finland. 
I have tried to suggest here that the pattern of party strength along 
the most important policy dimension does condition the nature of party 
bargaining and coalition formation. However Dodd's attempt to formalize 
this relationship seems to have a number of difficulties. The most 
important one is that small changes in the distribution of party strength, 
resulting in small changes in fragmentation and conflict cleavage, can 
actually bring about considerable changes in the qualitative features of 
the parliamentary situation. 
It is clear that patterns of electoral and polttr.ical strength tend to 
be stable over long periods, but that sudden quite dramatic changes do 
occur, and these also have considerali.·e impact on the nature of political 
bargaining. 
In essence there appears to be two kinds of electoral change. Examples 
of the first "slow" kind of change we have seen in the Netherlands and Italy, 
where a dominant central political party or group lost support, and these 
changes eventually brought about changes in the qualitative aspects of the 
political game. The second "fast" change we have seen in Belgium or Denmark. 
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In the latter case, new parties .came into existence quite abruptly to some 
extent because of the saliency of new issues. The nature of the electoral 
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system is of course crucial in that it determines whether such fast electoral 
change finds parliamentary expression. 
As we have seen here, the two relatively unstable countries 
(Italy and Finland) have been joined by two other countries (Belgium 
and Denmark) where fast change has increased political instability. 
In Ireland and the Netherlands, slow electoral change in party support 
has increased the difficulties of government or coalition formation. 
It is also reasonable to expect, on the basis of recent events, that 
government formation in Austria, Sweden and Iceland may become more 
difficult because of slow electoral change, and in Germany because of 
both slow and fast political change. 
At a more abstract level, it is debateable whether middle range 
theories (whe ther game theoretical or policy oriented in inspiration 
of the kind discussed here) can account for the complex variety of 
parliamentary behaviour. Formal work in social choice tends to the 
conclusion that political phenomena are, in quite a deep sense, non 
predictable. In particular, with only moderate constraints on the 
formation of new parties, electoral shifts might be expected to be quite 
dramatic, especially in a context of increasing economic difficulty. 
Notes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Norway (September 1981), Be lgium (November 1981), Netherlands , 
Denmark and Sweden (September 1982), Ireland (February and December , 
1982), Germany (March 1983), Austria and Iceland (April 1983), 
Italy (June 1983) . 
As we mentioned in the introduction however, in I celand a new 
feminist party with three seats (and more than 5% of the vote) 
came into parli amentary existence after the election in April 
1983. In West Germany the new Green party took 27 seats (just 
over 5%). 
The problem for the Christian Democrats is that there is no 
medium sized party on the right that the Christian Democrats can 
use as a "threat" against the medium sized Socialist party (PSI). 
The Socialists , together with the three other small parties 
(Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals) in the coalition 
with the Christian Democrats , increased their share of the vot e 
from about 17% in the 1979 election to about 24% in June 1983. The 
drop in the Christian Democrat share of th·� vote to 33% has increased 
the i:>argaining powers of the Socialists , and , in effect , allowed 
Craxi , of the Socialis ts , to become prime minister. Although the 
Communists lost some votes in this election , a coalition of the 
five parties of the centre lef t ,  including the Communists and 
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Socialists, but excluding the Christian Democrats , is now conceivable. 
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Table 1 
Average Duration of Govt . 
(months ) .  
until 1971 a fter 1971 
Austria 3 7  5 2  
Germany 40 4 2  
Belgium 2 8  12  
I ce land 33 35  
Luxembourg 41 48 
Norway 36 3 2  
Ire land 43 30 
Sweden 30 2 2  
Denmark 31 19 
Ne therlands 29 30 
F inland 1 3  1 7  
Italy 1 3  1 1  
Total 2 7  2 3  
Effective Numbe r 
unti l 1971 
2 . 2  
3 . 2 
2 . 9  
3 . 6  
3 . 1  
3 . 0  
2 . 8  
3 . 1  
3 . 8 
4 . 8  
5 . 0  
3 . 4 
3 . 4  
after 19 71 
2 . 2  
2 . 5  
5 . 8  
4 . 0  
3 . 8  
3 . 3  
2 . 5 
3 . 4  
5 . 7 
4 . 5  
5 . 4  
3 . 4  
3 . 9  
; ] I 
: --' 
MAJORITY 
PARTY 
SURPLUS 
COALITION 
MIN IMAL 
WINNING 
COALITION 
MINORITY 
COALITION 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 8 
Group 9 
Table 2 
A s ingle party holds a maj ority o f  the seats and 
forms the government . 
A s ingle party holds a maj or ity of the s eats but forms 
a coalition with o ther part ies , which obtain cabinet po s t s  
The coalition is unconnected ( in the s ense that not 
a l l  parties in the coal ition are adj acent to one 
another on the pol icy d imens ion) as wel l  as be ing 
surplus ( in the sense o f  containing a party which is 
unnecessary for a s impl e  maj ority) . 
The coal ition is connected but not minimal connected 
winning , and therefore no t minimal winning . 
The coalition is minimal connected winning but not 
minimal winning . 
The coa l ition is both minimal connected winning and 
minimal winning 
The coal ition is minimal winning but not minimal 
connected winning 
A minority coal it ion or non maj ority p ar ty has 
support from other p ar t ies which do no t have cabinet 
posts , to the extent that a maj ority is obtained . 
A minority coa l i t ion or non maj or ity party forms a 
government without any imp l icit support .  
1-:3 I 
N 
Table 3 
The Relationship between Coalition Duration and S tructural 
Features of the Parliamentary System* 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable : Duration 
IMajori ty S tatus Blonde! 
MW Laver 
Number Parties Taylor & Herman 
Fractionalism Taylor & Herman 
Diver sity Laver 
MCW Axelrod 
Coalition Status Dodd 
* Taken from Warwick ( 1979 ) 
Correlation 
Coe fficient 
. 299 
. 64 3  
- . 418 
- . 407 
- . 352 
· •  560 
- . 271 
Multiple 
Regre ssion Coe ff .  
. 145 
. 4 7 7  
- . 351 
. 036 
t-3 I 
w 
Table 4 :  Bipolar Sys tems 
Aus tria af ter February 1 9 5 3  
Symbol Par ty Name Electoral Vote % Seats % Conf lict Score 
A Communists (KPO ) 5 . 3  2 -5 
B Social i s t s  ( SPO) 42 . 1  44 -3 
c Peop le ' s  Party (OVP ) 41 . 3  45 1 
D Independents (VDU) 10 . 9  8 2 
O thers . 4  
Concentration = o . 4o 
Effective number = 2 . 5  
Conf lict Cleavage = 4 . 45 
W. Germany after the e lection of Sep t ember 1965 
Symbol Party Name 
B Social Democrats ( SDP) 
E Free Democrats (FDP) 
D Christian Democratic 
Party 
DFU and NPD 
Concentrat ion = o . 42 
Effective Number = 2 . 4 
Confl ict Cleavage = 2 .  77 
Electoral Vote % 
39 . 3  
9 . 5  
47 . 6  
3 . 6  
Seats % 
4 1  
10 
49 
Conflict 
-3 
2 
0 
H I 
� 
Table 5 
Moderate Conflict Cleavage and Moderate Fragmentation 
Symbol P arty Name 
A Communi s t s  
Socialis t s  
Be lgium after February 1946 
E lectoral Vote % 
B 
G 
H 
Chr i s ti an Social Party 
Libera l s  
12 . 7  
32 . 4  
42 . 5  
9 , 7  
2 . 7  O thers 
Concentration = . 34 
E f fec tive Number = 
Conf lict Cleavage = 
2 . 9  
6 .  77  
Seats % 
1 1  
3 4  
4 5  
8 
Luxembourg after October 1946 
Symbo l 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Party Name 
Communi s t s  
Sociali s t s  
Chri stian Soci al Party 
Liberals 
Concentra tion = . 34 
E f fective Number = 2 . 9  
Conflict = 5 . 24 
Ice l and after June 1946 
Symbol 
A 
B 
c 
D 
- Party Name 
Communi s t s  
Social Democrats 
Progre ssives 
Independence Party 
Concentrat ion = . 2 70 
Effective Number = 3 . 70 
Conf lict Cleavage = 7 . 7 1 
Electoral Vote % 
1 9 . 5  
1 7 . 8  
2 3 . 1  
3 9 . 4  
Seats % 
10 
20 
50 
20 
Seat % 
10 
17 
2 7  
3 6  
Conflict 
-6 
-3 
1 
2 
Conf lict 
-5 
-3 
0 
2 
Conflict 
-5 
-3 
0 
2 
1-3 I Vl 
Symbol 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Tab le 6 
Unipolar Sys tems 
Norway after September 196 1 
P arty Name E lectoral Vote % 
Soci al i s t  Peop les P arty 2 . 49 
Labour P ar ty 4 6 . 8  
Liberals 8 . 9 
Chris ti an Peop le s P arty 9 . 6 
Agrari an P arty 9 . 3 
Conservative s  20 . 00 
C oncentration = 
E f fective Number 
3 . 3 
= 3 . 0 
Conf lict Cleavage = 5 . 6 2  
Sweden after September 1 956 
Symbol 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
P arty Name 
Communi s t  
Soc . Dem . Labour 
Agrari an 
Liberal Peoples P arty 
Conservative s 
Concentrat ion = 
E f fective Number 
Conflict Cleavage 
. 3 1 
= 3 . 2  
= 3 . 74 
E l ectoral Vote % 
5 . 0 
44 . 6  
9 . 4 
23 . 8  
1 7 . 1  
Denmark after November 1960 
Symbol 
;B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
P arty Name 
Sociali sts 
Social Democrat s 
Radical Liberals 
Agrarians 
Conservatives 
Others 
Concentration = . 26 
E ffective Number = 3 . 8  
Conf lict Cleavage = 2 . 73 
E lectoral Vote % 
6 . 1  
4 2 . 1  
5 . 8  
2 1 . 1  
1 7 . 9  
7 . 0 
Seats % 
1 
4 9  
9 
10 
1 1  
1 9  
Seats % 
2 
46 
8 
25 
18 
Seats % 
6 
43 
6 
22 
1 8  
4 
Conflict 
-4 
""'.'3 
0 
0 
1 
3 
Conflict 
-5 
-3 
-1 
0 
2 
Conf lict 
-1 
-2 
-1 
1 
2 
2 
H I 
°' 
Table 6 (contd . )  
Ireland after May 1 9 5 1  
Symbol Party Name Electoral Vote % 
A Labour 1 1 . 4  
c F inna Fail 46 . 3  
D Clann na Talmhan 4 . 0 
E F ine Gael 25 . 7  
x Others 12 . 6  
Concentration = . 2 7  
Effective Numb er = 3 . 6  
Conflict Cleavage = 1 . 0 
Seats % 
1 3  
4 7  
4 
27 
1 2  
Conf l ict 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
H I 
'-I 
Tab le 7 
Multipolar Sys tems 
(Po l arized hyperfractionism) 
Finl and after July 1 95 8  
Symbol Party Name 
Concentration = 0 . 2  
E f fective Number = 5 . 0  
Confl i ct Cle avage = 6 . 5 
Symbol 
A 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
P arty Name 
Communi s t s  
Soci alis t s  
Social Democrats 
Republicans 
Chri stian Democrats 
Liberal s 
Monarchi s t s  
I talian Soc i al 
Other s 
Concentrat ion = 
Effective Number 
. 2 8  
3 . 6 
Conf lict Cle avage = 7 . 6 2  
Ele ctoral Vote % 
! tall after June 1953 
E l ectoral Vo te % 
22 . 6  
12 . 7  
4 . 5  
1 . 6 
40 . l  
3 . 8  
6 . 9 
5 . 8  
1 . 3  
Seats % 
Se ats % 
24 
13 
3 
1 
45 
2 
7 
5 
Conflict 
Conflict 
-5 
-3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
t-3 I CX> 
Table 8 
Netherlands af ter May 1946 
Symbol Party Name 
A Communists 
c Labour 
F Ant i-revolutionary 
G Catholic Peop le ' s  Party 
H Chri s t ian Union 
J Liberal s  
K Po l i tical Reform Par ty 
Others 
Concentration = , 22 
E ff ective Numb er = 4 . 8  
Confl ict Cleavage = 7 . 38 
E lectoral Vo te % 
10 . 6  
28 . 3  
12 . 9  
30 . 8  
7 . 8  
6 . 4 
2 . 1 
1 . 0 
Seat % 
10 
29 
1 3  
32 
8 
6 
2 
Conf lict 
-5 
-3 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
1-3 I 
� 
Appendix 
Type of Coalition Governments in 
We st European Countries 1945 - 1983 
l .  Single Party 
Maj ority 
2 .  Surplus Coalition 
with maj ority 
party 
. J .  Unconnected non 
HW coalition 
4 .  Connected (but 
non MW coalition 
s .  K<ll but not Kl 
coalition 
SURPLUS COALITION 
6 .  HW and H<ll 
coalition 
7 .  HW but not HQI 
coalition 
MINIMAL COALITION 
8 .  Minority coalition 
with support 
9 .  Minority coalition 
without support 
' 
MINORITY COALITION 
TOTAL 
Table 1 :  Total Duration of .European Governments by Type : 1945-1971 
AU::i «.;t.K lll!:L lCe LUX NOR lRE SWE D.EN NET 
48 l 46 191  ' 149 24 � r 
• 
48 98 I 
1 4 7  
40 5 i 150 
20 
48 98 0 40 5 0 0 0 0 217 -. . 
197  159 92 105 326 85 73  86 5 3  
22 166 176 73 45 
197 181 258 281 326 135 73 73 86 98 
5 10 4 7  36 159 189 
5 1 42 �4 36 3 
0 • 5 15 0 4 8  78  203 225 3 
292 279 309 336 331 324 300 300 311  318  
A- 1  
FIN ITA TOTALS . 
r I I 458 
62 207 
70 16 133 
87 7 289 
I 98 118 
157 183 747 -
70 1246 
39 521 
10 39 1767 
47  12  565 
32 14 1 7 7  
7 9  86 - 742 
lOO 308 3714 - -
A-2 
Table 2: Proportional Dis tribution of European Governments by Type : 1945 - 1971 
AU:; l>l::tt .111::1. lL:J:; LUX. NON. ll<E SWE Dl::N NET FIN ITA TOTALS 
l .  Single Party I t \ 1 I I Maj ority 16 15 59 50 8 0 ! I 12 -- -
• 1 2 .  Surplu• Coalition 1 I I 20 6 with majority 16 35 party r . 3 .  Unconnected non 15 23 5 4 MW coalition 
4 .  Connected (but 12  2 47  29  2 8 non HW coalition 
s .  HCW but not MW 
6 32 3 coalition 
SURPLUS COALITION 16 35 0 12  2 0 0 0 0 68 5 2  5 9  21 -
6 .  HW and HCW 67  
coalition 
5 2  29 31 98 26 24 28 17  20 0 33 
7. MW but not HC\J 13 54 5 2  24 14 13 14 coalition 
MINIMAL COAL� • iON 67  65 83 83 98 26 24 24 28 31  20 13  47 
8 .  Minority coalition 
2 3 12 60 0 . 16 23 16 with aupport 15 53 
9. Minority coali tion 
without support 
2 14 15 12 1 11  5 4 
( 
MINORITY COALITION 2 1 27 28 . 20 0 5 0 15 26 68 72 
Herfindahl Index .45 . 31 I • 34 ,28 12 3 3  35 . 32 • 26 . 2 1  . 20 • ·  29 . 29  - . 
Effective N Par t i es 2 .2 ) .2 2 .9 ) .6 I J . 1  J .0 2 .0 J ·2 J ·8 4 ·8 5 ·0 3 ·4 J . 4  
1 .  Single Party 
Maj ority 
2 .  Surplua Coalition 
with majority 
party 
3 .  Unconnec ted non 
MW coalition 
4 .  Connected (but 
non MW coalition 
5 .  MCW but not Kl 
coalition 
SUllPLUS COALITION 
6 .  MW and HCW 
coalition 
7 .  MW but not MCW 
coali tion 
MINIMAL COALITION 
e .  Minority coal ition 
with aupport 
9 .  Minority coali tion 
without support 
' 
MINORITY COALITION 
NO . of GOVERNMENTS 
Table 3 :  Frequency o f  European Governments by Type 1945 - 1971 
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN 
1 1 0 0 4 ' 3 1 0 -� I 
I 
2 2 1 
I 
1 
l l J 
2 2 0 1 l 0 0 0 0 
5 4 4 3 7 2 3 2 
1 5 4 2 
-
5 5 9 7 7 2 2 3 2 
1 l 2 1 3 5 
1 l 1 3 3 
1 2 3 2 6 8 
8 7 11 10 B 9 7 10 10 
A- 3 
NET FIN ITA TOTALS 
I 10 
4 8 
l 5 2 8 
4 7 1 13  
l 5 6 
6 12 12  35 
2 4 0 36 
2 1 15 
4 4 l 51 
2 8 23 
1 5 2 17  
1 7 10 40 
1 1  23 23 136 
' 
Table 4 :  Average Duration of European Governmen ts by Type : 1945-1971  
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET 
I I 48 I I 1 1 .  Single Party I so I I Majority 48 46 21, r 
I I 2 .  Surp lu1 Coalition f -with maj ority 24 49 • i ! party I l ' 3 .  Unconnected non 1 I MW coalition ! 47 4 .  Connected (but 40 t l 5 . 38 non MW coalition I r 
5 .  MCW but not HW I I \ 20 coali tion 
I 
SURPLUS COALITION 24 49 40 l 5 36 
6 .  HW and �cw t 2 7  39 40 23 35 46 43 24 43 coalition I 7 .  MW but not HCW 22 33 44 37 23 coali tion 
MINIMAL COALITION 39 36 28 40 
I 
46 43 37  24 43 25 
8 .  Minority coalition 5 10 24 36 53 38 wi th 1upport 
I 9 .  Minority coali tion 5 1 42 15 12 3 without support 
HINOB.ITY COALITION 20 . 15 8 16 39 JO 28 3 
TOTAL 3 7  40 28 33 4 1  36 4 3 30 ]l 29 
I I I I 
FIN 
l I I i 
I 
I 
i 
I I 
I 14 
12 
I 
I I 
I 
I I 
13  I 
15 
15 
24 
6 
11  
13 
I 
A�4 
ITA TOTALS 
16 
8 
7 I I 
20 I 
l 
I 
15 
' i ' 
39 
39 
9 
7 
9 
13  
46 
26 
1 7  
21 
20 
21 
. .  
' 
35 
35 \ 
I 
--:1 35 . 
1 
I 
25 i 
I 10 ! .. 
i 
1 9  I 
27 l I 
I 
Table 5 :  Total Duration of European Governments by Type in the 1 970 ' &  
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET 
1 .  Single Party I 90 I I ! Maj ority I 4 8 I 
i 
2 .  Surplu1 Coalition i I i with majority ' , I I 
party t ' ( I 3 .  l Unconnected non 3 1  40 l HW coalition I ) I 4 .  Connected {but l non MW coalition I l I I s .  KCW but not HW I I 62 coalition I : : 
·� l SURPLUS COALITION 3 1  \ I 6 2  40 : 
1 -.. t 6 .  MW and HCW 125 5 1  66 35 45 I 5 2  coa lition l 
1 .  MW but not KCW 26 i 6 1  5 2  ! I coalition l 
HlNlHAL COALITION 125 7 1  6 6  I 96 52 45 ] 5 2 I 
I 
8 .  Minority coalition 6 7  
with 1upport 
16 57 I 
9 .  Minority coalit ion 2 128 18 47 7 5  5 
without support • 
' 
MINORITY COALITION 6 7  2 18 132 12B 6 J  5 
TOTAL 157 125 l lO 106 96 1 2B 1 1 8  108 D' 119 
I I I 
FIN 
I 
' I 
I 
I 6 9  
I 
l f 
i 
-r 
, 6 9  I l l 
33 
3 3  
16 
16 
118 
I 
A-5 
ITA TOTALS 
26 
32 I 
I 
20 I 
t � 
I 78 I . 
: 
12 
1 38 
. -
166 
32 
82 
280 
374 
1 84  \ 
I 
1 2  -�  : 
l 
32 172 ' i I 
14 305 I 
! 
; 
46 
I 
477 I 
136 1453 l ! 
I 
Table 6 :  Proportional Duration of European Governments by type in the 1970 ' s  
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET 
l .  Single Party I 57 l I 41 l I Maj ority I I I I t I 2 .  Surplua Coalition ! I with maj ority , p arty !. I I \ I 3 .  Unconnec ted non i MW coalition 28 38 l I 
4 .  Connected (but t I I 
non MW coalition . I , I 5 .  MCW but not Kl \ coalition 5 1  I I i " I SURPLUS COALITION 28 38 I 5 1  I i 
6 .  HW and HCW i coalition 100 46 62 36 49 4 9  
7 .  HW but  not HCW 44 I 24 6 4  l coalition r 
I 4 9  MINIMAL COALITION 100 70 62 100 4 4  4 9  I 
8 .  Minority coalition 
43 51 with aupport 
9 .  Minority coali tion 
without support 2 100 1 5  5 1  4 9  
\ I 
KlNOllITY COALITION 46 2 100 8 5 1  100 
Herfindahl Index . 4 6 .40 • 17 .25 .26 .30 40 29 • 17 · 22 
Ef fect ive N Parties 2 . 2  I 2 . 5 s . s I 4 .o I 3 . 8 ) .) 2 . 5 I 3 .4 S . 7 4 .5 
nN 
I 
I 
I 
5 8  
J 
5 8  
28 
28 
1 4  
14 
0 19 
1s . 4 
A-6 
ITA TOTALS 
19 
24 I 
I I 
15 I j I 
I 
58 
: 
I 
� 
9 
9 
2 3  
10 
33 
. 29 
3 . 4 
9 
1 2  
2 
6 
� 6 13 I . 
I 
- ---. 
39 l -:1 I 
l 20 I 
i 32 I 
. 25 I 
I 
3 . Q  I 
Table 7 :  Frequency of European Governments by Type in the 1970 1 &  
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET 
1 .  Single Party I I 1 I 1 2 ' Maj ority I I 
I l I 2 .  Surplus Coalition 1 ' with majority i , ! 
party r I 
1 ( I 3 .  Unconnected non l MW coalition 3 I t 4 .  Connected (but 
non MW coali tion . . 
' 
5 .  MCW but not Kl I coalition I 2 --
SURPLUS COALITION 3 1 } 2 
I 6 .  MW and HGV 3 , coalition 2 2 1 2 1 
7 .  MW but not MCW 
coalition 3 l 1 I 
MINIMAL COALITION 3 5 2 
I 
2 1 2 1 
. 8 .  Minority coalition 
with 1upport 1 l 3 
9 .  Minority coali tion 
without support 1 '  
' 4 2 2 4 1 
l 
MINORITY COALITION 1 1 1 4 2 3 7 1 
TOTAL 3 3 9 3 2 4 4 5 7 4 
I I I 
FIN ITA 
I I I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 4 2 I 
· 1  I 3 
I 
I 1 
I 
I I I 6 l 4 
1 2 
1 2 
1 
� 3 
2 4 
7 12 
I 
I I 
I 
l 
\ 
l 
A-7 
TOTALS 
. -
3 
10 
3 
3 
16 
11 
8 
I 
I 
I 
- � 19 : ' 
l 
! 5 i 
( 
. 19 I 
l .. 
I 25 I 
63 l I 
I 
' 
l 
Table 8 :  Average Duration of European Governments by Type i n  the 1970 ' &  
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR I RE  SWE DEN NET 
i I \ I I I I ; J 1 1 . Single Party i I 48 I I I I Maj ority I 4 5  I I l I I I ; I 2 .  Surplus Coalition i ! I I J with maj ority I J I . party I I I [ I i I I ' I 3 .  Unconnected non 10 40 I I I MW coali tion t t I j I 4 .  Connected (but l l non MW coalition 1 l I . 3 1  5 .  MCW but not HW I I coalition I ' ' I ' I 
! I I I SURPLUS COALITION 10 40 31  ! 
1 I 
6 .  MW and MCW 4 2  35 23 1 52 25 33 coalition 
I 7 .  MW but not MCW 9 6 1  5 2  coalition 
MINIMAL COALITION 42 15 33  48 52 23 5 2  
I 
8 .  Minority coalition 16 19 with support 67 
9 .  Minority coali tion 2 36 9 24 19 5 without support i 
I 
MINORITY COALITION 67 2 36 9 .21 19 5 
TOTAL 5 2  4 2  12 3 5  48 32 30 22 19 3(1 
I I I I 
FIN 
I 
! 
i 
I 
' 
1 7  
I 
17  
I 
I 
I 
33 
33 
8 
8 
17 
I 
A- 8  
ITA TOTALS 
I 13 16 I 
I 
11 I 11 
I I 
20 I 27 
I 
! 
13 \ 18 
' r 
h 
i 33 
6 23 I . 
I 
6 · -� ' 
I 
32 
I 
i I 
5 15 I 
I 
12 l� ' i 
11 u l I I 
I l 
Table 9 :  Total Duration o f  European Governments by Type : 1945 - 1983 
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET 
i I l 1 9 1  I 1 l .  Single Party 1 38 46 1 9 7  I 24 I Majority I I I 
I 
2 .  Surplus Coalition i I � with maj ority 48 9 8  I 
' • party I 
3 .  I ( ' I I Unconnected non 3 1  40 1 J 4 7  Kl coalit ion i � I J t 4 .  Connected (bu t I 40 5 l 150 DDn MW coali tion I I l I s .  HCW but not HW 82 coalition I i 
i I SURPLUS COALITION 48 98 31 so 5 2 79  ,I 
1 I 6 .  HW and MCW 197 21!4 143 1 7 1  361 85 1 1 8  8 6  r 105 coali tion l I 7 .  HW but not MCW 22 192 176 6 1  125 l 45 coal i tion 
MINIHAL COALITION 1 9 7  306 335 34 7 422 85 125 ll8 86 J 150 
I 
8 .  Minority coalition 6 7  5 10 4 7  36 1 75 246 
with support 
Minority coalition 9 .  2 5 129 60 9 1  111 ij without support 
6 7  7 15 96 266 357 8 MINORITY COALITION 176 
TOTAL 450 404 4 19 4 4 2  4 2 7  4 5 2  418 401:! 443 4 3 7 
I I I I 
FIN 
I I , 
I ! 
I 
! l 
i 1 39 
8 7  ' 
I 
I 
I 226 / l 
70 
33 
1
1 03 
4 7  
4 8  
9 5  
424 
I 
A-9 
ITA TOTALS 
596 
6 2  207 
4 2  I 299 
39 I 321 I 
I I 
118 I 200 
I 
I 
I 
261 ! 1027 ' 
16.20 
5 1  705 I 
I 
5 1  ��2  
j 
104 7 37 i i ( 
28 ·182 
I 
I 
! 
I 
132 1 219 
i 
I 
444 5167 l ! 
' 
1 
Table 10: Proportional Duration of European Governments by Type : 1945-1983 
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET FIN 
I I ! I I I I l l I 1 .  Single Party l I j I Maj ority 29 I 11 9 2  37 I 6 I I I l ' 
Surplus Coalition I 
I, 
2 .  1 1  26 
.. I 
with maj ority • I 
party I I i 
9 r I } I 3 .  Unconnected non 7 1 17 I 33 MW coal i tion I t \ 4 .  Connected (but 9 l l 35 I 21 no n  MW coalition I I I . 5 .  MCW but no t MW i coali t ion ! 17  I I 
I I l SUB.PLUS COALITION 10 26 7 18 1 l 69 I 54 ! r I 
6 .  MW and MCW ! coali tion 45 64 34 39 85 19 30 20 25 15 7 .  MW b u t  not MCW I coali tion 10 46 40 14 30 I 11 8 
MINIMAL COALITION 45 74 80 79 
I 
99 19 30 30 20 36 23 
\ 
{ 8 .  Minority coalit ion with support 15 1 2 10 9 41  58  1 1  
9 .  Minority coalition 1 23 22 I 1 12 wi thout support l 29 24 I 
' 39 33 MINORITY COALITION 15 2 J 64 BO 1 23 
I I I I 
A- 10 
ITA TOTALS 
/ 12 
15 4 
I 
10 I 6 
4 I 6 
I 
28 l • 4 I 
I 5 7  I ! 20 
31  
I I 12 14 I I 
12 ---:1 ' 
l 
14  ! 
25 i 
6 9 I 
! 
31 23 I 
I I 
I 1 .  Single Party Maj ority 
2 .  Surplus Coalition 
with majority 
party 
3 .  Unconnected non 
MW coalit ion 
4 .  Connected (bu t 
non MW coa l ition 
5 .  HCW but not MW 
coalition 
SUBPLUS COALITION 
I 
6 .  MW and MCW I coali tion 
7 .  MW but not MCW 
coalition 
HINDIAI. COALITION 
a .  Minority coalition 
with 11upport 
9 .  Minority coalit ion 
without support 
' 
1 MINORITY COALITION 
TOTAL 
Table 1 1 :  Frequency of European Governments by Type:  1945 - 1983 
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN Nl::T 
3 I l I 4 I ! 1 l 4 I 1 ' I ! 
• j� I j 2 2 I 
, ' 
I I r I \ 3 1 1 l l t � } I 1 'i 1 4 I I ' 3 
I 
2 2 3 2 \ l B 
! 
I 
5 7 6 5 8 2 5 2 I 3 
1 8 4 i 1 3 I 2 
5 8 14 9 ! 9 2 3 5 2 J 5 
I 
1 1 1 2 1 4 8 \ 
1 1 5 3 5 7 I 2 
' 
l 2 2 7 4 9 15 2 
1 1  10 20 1 3  10 13 1 1  15 17 15. 
I I I I 
FIN 
l 
I 
I 
I I 
I I i 
I 9 
I 7 
I 
f 
i 
\ I 16 l 
4 
1 I I 
I 
5 
2 
7 
9 
30 
I 
A- 1.l 
ITA TOTALS 
13 
4 8 
I 
4 I 18 
I 
" I 1 7 I I 
6 I 9 
I ' 
! 5 2 1 8  i 
• 
t -
� 47 
' 
3 23 I 
I · ·---1 
3 70 ! . 
I 
/ 
9 29. ) I I 
5 36 I ! 
· ---- ---
i 
14 6�  
35 2on i I 
Tab l e  1 2 :  Average Duration of European Governments by Type : 1945-198� 
AUS GER BEL ICE LUX NOR IRE SWE DEN NET FIN 
I 46 I I I I I 49 1 I 1 I 46 48 24 l I 1 .  Single Party l I ' I I I Maj ority I 
' I l I 2 .  Surplu• Coalition 24 49 ! � with majority , I i l party I i 
29 r I I I I i 3 .  Unconnected non l I HW coalition 10 47  15  ( 
4 .  Connected (but 
40 . 5 } 38 12 DOD MW coali tion I . 27 I s .  KC:W but not Kl coalition ! 
I ' I 14 SUllPLUS COALITION 24 49 10 35 I s 35 ! I 
6 .  HW and KCW 40 1,0 24 34 45 43 24 l 43 f 35 15 coalition I 7 .  HW but not HCW 22 24 44 61 42 23 33 coali tion 
MINIMAL COALITION 40 38 24 39 47 43 42 24 43 30 19 
8 .  Minori ty coali t ion 67  5 10 24 36 44 3 1  24 with support 
9. Minority coalition 2 s 26 20 18  16 4 7 without support � 
' 
MINORITY COALITION 67  24 24 4 l 7 8 25 30 10 I TOTAL 40 40 21 43 35 38 27  26 29 14 34 
l I I I I I 
I 
' 
I l 
A� l2 
ITA TOTALS 
16 
I 
1 1  I 
10 I I I 
20 I ! 
I 
15 I 
I 
17 
17 
12 
6 
9 
13 
- -
45 
26 
16 
19 
24 
20 
34 
31 l 
--:-1 33 . 
---1 
2 5  i 
I 13  I . . 
19 i 
l 
26 i 
, 
